Tag Archive: China

Sep
29
2011

Trust Loans and Property Developers in China

Seeing how the Chinese government is restricting funding avenues to property developers in China, it would take a very brave investor to invest into the country’s property companies.

The latest emphasis by the regulator is to check on the financing by property developers using trust loans.

Trust loans are usually short-term debt that’s repackaged into investment products and sold to retail investors.

This reminds me of US subprime loans  that were repackaged and sold to investors in a different way. In this case, the loans are made by the property developers themselves.

With half of the new debts taken by Chinese developers in the past year being trust loans, we might see a problem if developers are unable to get access to any form of credit for rolling over these loans. They will then be forced to cut their prices to clear their inventory in order to raise cash.

The high gearing of some of these developers doesn’t help.

I can still remember a particular SGX-listed REIT which relied solely on Commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) for its financing. When the credit markets were frozen up in 2008, they were unable to get any new CMBS to roll over their debt and had to raise capital urgently.

This article below pretty much sums it up the risks facing China property developers.

Greentown woes reveal risks in China property boom

Permanent link to this article: http://www.martinlee.sg/trust-loans-and-property-developers-in-china/

Jul
13
2011

Celestial Nutrifoods Money Go Round

The following account submitted by the provisional liquidator of Celestial Nutrifoods shows just how well (and fast) fraudsters can act to move money and assets out of legal shareholders’ reach before they can even blink their eye.

I bet whatever “nutrients” is left in the company would have already been sucked dry.

An expensive and painful lesson for all Celestial Nutrifoods shareholders.

The Provisional Liquidator of Celestial Nutrifoods Limited (In Provisional Liquidation) (the “Company”) wishes to announce that:

The Provisional Liquidator has taken steps to assert control over the Company’s subsidiaries in the British Virgin Islands (“BVI”) and the People’s Republic of China (“China”) and commence investigations into the affairs of the subsidiaries. The Company has three (3) immediate wholly owned subsidiaries in the BVI, namely Clear Faith Holdings Limited, Giant Fortune Group Limited and Max Dragon Investments Limited (collectively “the BVI Subsidiaries”).

Initially, the registered agent of the BVI Subsidiaries refused to recognise the appointment of the Provisional Liquidator pursuant to the Order of the High Court of the Republic of Singapore dated 24 December 2010 (“Appointment Order”) and refused to accede to the instructions of the Provisional Liquidator to register a change in the board of directors of the BVI Subsidiaries. In turn, this prevented the Provisional Liquidator from immediately taking action, through the BVI Subsidiaries, to gain control of the subsidiaries located in China.

In order to resolve the abovementioned situation, the Provisional Liquidator had no alternative but to seek recognition of the Appointment Order from the Supreme Court of Bermuda. The Supreme Court of Bermuda duly recognised the appointment of the Provisional Liquidator on 31 January 2011.

Having changed the composition of the boards of directors of the BVI Subsidiaries, the Provisional Liquidator sought to exercise the powers of the BVI Subsidiaries to change the board of directors and the legal representatives of their Chinese subsidiaries, Daqing Sun Moon Star Co., Ltd, Daqing Celestial Sun Moon Star Protein Co., Ltd and Daqing Weitian Energy Co., Ltd (collectively “the PRC Subsidiaries”). The Daqing branch of the Administration for Industry & Commerce (“AIC”) refused to register the proposed changes on the basis that the PRC Subsidiaries are no longer owned by the BVI Subsidiaries.

In this regard investigations since undertaken suggest that the following share transfers have been registered by the Daqing AIC:

  • shares representing 2% of the issued shares of each of the PRC Subsidiaries were transferred to Weihai Zhuozhan Import & Export Co. Ltd. (威海桌展进出口有限公司) on or around 11 August 2010;
  • shares representing 73% of the issued shares of each of the PRC Subsidiaries were transferred to Weihai Guosheng Real Property Development Co. Ltd. (威海国盛房地产开发有限责任公司) on or around 4 December 2010; and
  • shares representing 25% of the issued shares of each of the PRC Subsidiaries were transferred to Rui Feng Group Limited (锐丰集团有限公司) on or around 4 December 2010.

None of the abovementioned share transfers have previously been disclosed to the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”) by the Company’s directors. The Company’s Chairman has, upon enquiry by the Provisional Liquidator, since advised that the transfers occurring on or around 4 December 2010 arose as a result of China Construction Bank (the PRC Subsidiaries’ primary banker) exercising their collateral rights with respect to the shares in the PRC Subsidiaries upon becoming aware that the Company was to be delisted from the SGX.

In this regard, the Provisional Liquidator notes that the existence of share pledges over the shares in the PRC Subsidiaries was also not previously disclosed to the SGX, nor was any default under the loan facilities of China Construction Bank or the enforcement action taken by China Construction Bank.

The Provisional Liquidator is currently investigating the abovementioned share transfers. The Chairman of the Company has commenced communicating information to the Provisional Liquidator in relation to these transfers. The Provisional Liquidator will continue to investigate in this regard and take such action as he deems expedient.

The Provisional Liquidator’s investigations have also revealed significant transfers to external parties of the Company’s cash holdings in the year, and in particular in the six months preceding the appointment of the Provisional Liquidator, at a time when the Company, in the Provisional Liquidator’s view, appeared to be insolvent (given the indebtedness to bondholders which was immediately due and payable).

In this regard, approximately SGD16.7 million was paid to a company incorporated in the BVI who has not responded to the Provisional Liquidator’s correspondence but who, based on the advice of the Company’s Chairman, is a supplier to one of the Company’s PRC Subsidiaries. The Provisional Liquidator is currently inquiring into the above transfers.

At this point in time the Provisional Liquidator considers it extremely unlikely that any dividend will be paid to the Company’s shareholders.

Any queries in relation to this matter may be directed to either Mark Chadwick or Hubert Chang of this office (+65 6831 7820).

Yit Chee Wah
Provisional Liquidator
13 July 2011

Permanent link to this article: http://www.martinlee.sg/celestial-nutrifoods-money-go-round/

Jun
29
2011

China Yurun Food Group Hurt by Muddy Waters Rumors

The share price of Chinese meat processor China Yurun Food Group has come under pressure in the last few days with rumors that Muddy Waters is going to release a negative research report on it.

A quick check at the Muddy Waters website shows that their latest target is Spreadtrum, Communications Inc (SPRD).

Singapore state investor Temasek Holdings and China-focused private equity firm Hopu had invested in Yurun last year. Fund houses J.P. Morgan Asset Management and Fidelity were also shareholders.

While the rumors have not been confirmed yet, the recent spate of negative publicity involved China based companies does bring out an interesting point.

If big institutional investors with their research teams are not able to detect an ongoing fraud, what chance does an individual retail investor has?

In an earlier case involving Sino-Forest, renowned hedge fund manager John Paulson also got burnt.

In a note to his private investors, John Paulson mentioned that as a passive investor in public companies, he had access to the same information that everyone else does.

While his firm does conduct considerable due diligence including site visits, they must still rely on audits and underwriter due diligence that financial statements and disclosures are accurate.

For Sino-Forest, John Paulson also knew that Temasek Holdings had acquired a 16% stake back in March 2007 after months of due diligence. This was something that gave him comfort then, but as it turns out, doesn’t count for anything.

Permanent link to this article: http://www.martinlee.sg/china-yurun-food-group-hurt-by-muddy-waters-rumors/

Mar
23
2011

United Renminbi Bond Fund Launch

United Renminbi bond fund will start trading from 3rd May 2011 and the initial offer period will be from 16th March 2011 to 29th April 2011.

While there are already a couple of Renminbi bond funds that cater to the accredited investors space, UOB Asset Management (UOBAM) is the first fund house in Singapore that will offer a Renminbi bond fund to retail investors.

The United Renminbi bond fund offers investors an opportunity to gain from a potential Renminbi appreciation while at the same time continue to enjoy the coupons from the underlying bonds.

The Fund will currently invest primarily in Renminbi denominated debt securities (“RMB Debt Instruments”) issued or distributed outside mainland China. The issuers of such securities include, but are not limited to, governments, quasi-government bodies, international and multinational organisations, banks and financial institutions, and corporations.

In addition, the Fund may also invest in onshore debt instruments via institutions that have obtained Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor status (“QFII”) in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), or by purchasing derivative products linked to such onshore debt instruments (“Access Products”), including, but not limited to, participating certificates and participatory notes offered or issued by institutions which have obtained QFII status.

In order to obtain a full exposure to the Renminbi currency, the Fund will not typically be hedged in terms of currency, unless the Fund Manager deems appropriate to protect the investment returns.

The Fund has the flexibility to invest in other debt instruments that are not denominated in RMB. It may also invest in other instruments such as credit-linked notes, currency forwards, non-deliverable forwards (NDFs), CNH forward contracts, interest rate swaps and cross-currency swaps.

The fund is available in both US$ and S$ and the minimum investment required to invest in the fund is S$5000 or US$5000. It is available in both cash and SRS.  The management fee of the fund is currently 1% p.a. and can go up to a maximum of 2%p.a.

The United Renminbi bond fund prospectus can be found here:

United Renminbi Bond Fund Prospectus

This product might be suitable for customers who:

  • Want exposure to the Renminbi
  • Are willing and able to tolerate investment and currency risks investing in a new but developing CNH bond market
  • Have a medium to long term investment horizon

This product is not suitable for customers who:

  • Have a short term investment horizon
  • Are not willing to tolerate the investment and currency risks investing in a new but developing CNH bond market; who cannot tolerate any potential loss in their capital.

UOB to launch Yuan bond fund, new Yuan deposits (Straits Times)

Permanent link to this article: http://www.martinlee.sg/united-renminbi-bond-fund-launch/

Mar
03
2011

S-Chips Scandal Again!

It seems that the Singapore listed China companies (or S-Chips) are back in the limelight again.

Two firms, China Hongxing and polyester fibre manufacturer Hongwei Technologies have been suspended from trading due to accounting irregularities.

For China Hongxing, irregularities have been found in the cash and bank balances, accounts receivables, accounts payables and other expenses during the audits of subsidiary companies in China.

For Hongwei Technologies, auditor Ernst and Young highlighted issues pertaining to the cash and bank balances of its Chinese subsidiary Shuangli (Xiamen) Polyester Co Ltd.

The two companies join a list of more than 15 counters which are suspended from trading. The majority of these counters are S-chips companies.

I’m hardly surprised at the latest revelations. Forging fake revenue (with a tell-tale sign of large receivables that never gets collected) is a tactic used by fraudulent China firms to boost their earnings prior to seeking a listing in Singapore. Stealing cash from their bank balances is another.

Unfolding events have pretty much tallied with the confessions of this S-chip CEO which I urge you to read if you have not yet done so.

Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.

S-Chips anyone?

Permanent link to this article: http://www.martinlee.sg/s-chips-scandal-again/

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